Chat Control: the kompromat machine the EU Commission tries to build

Get organized on stopscanningme.eu

Update (2024-06-20): No Majority on Chat Control for Belgium.

Update (2024-06-17): CCC: Horse Trading While Nobody is Watching. It’s soccer EM right now.

Update (2024-06-14): European Council wants to vote on June 19th to establish Chat Control. The European Court of Human Rights just (May 28th) decided that such legislation is a violation of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Find out how to contact your governments representatives on EU Whoiswho.

Update (2024-05-22): The Belgium Minister of the Interior wants all EU citizens to be forced to agree to scanning and reporting to be able to send images or videos. They offer to limit sending any suspicion to EU agents to „when it is seen twice“, but then they’ll also have to count the first match for that, and when you send an image to your partner and they send it to their mother (“funny!”), that’s already seen twice.

Update (2023-11-14): EU-Parliament rejects chat-control! Next: it has to be stopped in the council, too.

Update (2023-09-13): in an Open letter EDRi and 81 organisations urge EU countries to say no to the CSAR mass surveillance proposal. On September 5th the chair responsible for chat-control said the decision will be on September 28th (leaked document in German). That’s in two weeks.

Update (2023-01): Yohansson lies again: Patrick Breyer: EU Commissioner Ylva Johnansson lies about #ChatControl — debunking the lies.

Update (2022-12): Maxim debunked Lies about Chatcontrol by EU Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs Monique Pariat who serves Commissioner Ylva Johansson.

Update (2022-05): I wrote a reply to initiative the EU Commission where they asked for public feedback.

On march 30th May 11th 2022 they want to propose their parliamentary bill.

Get informed now and get active against Chat Control!

Background

PDF (drucken)

“The EU wants to oblige providers to search all private chats, messages, and emails automatically for suspicious content – generally and indiscriminately. The stated aim: To prosecute child pornography. The result: Mass surveillance by means of fully automated real-time messaging and chat control and the end of secrecy of digital correspondence.” — messaging-and-chat-control

That’s a kompromat machine.

More than 80% of the material the algorithms report is legal, but given that these algorithms must be tuned to focus on the most sensitive and private types of content, it is almost certain that it is material that would end a career if used by political enemies for character assassination or would fully compromise people if used for blackmail.

Protecting children is important, but the means to do so is not to take away the ability of these children to communicate confidentially.

The means to protect children is to use all the money that would be needed to check reports from this kompromat-machine and instead to put it into prevention programs and pro-active operations by social workers in places that children use to communicate.